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Abstract
We analyze the impact of privatization on multifactor productivity
(MFP) using long panel data for nearly the universe of initially state-
owned manufacturing firms in four economies.  Controlling for firm
and industry-year fixed effects and employing a wide variety of
measurement approaches, we estimate that majority privatization
raises MFP about 28% in Romania, 22% in Hungary, and 3% in
Ukraine, with some variation across specifications, while in Russia it
lowers it about 4%.  Privatization to foreign rather than domestic
investors has a larger impact (about 44%) and is much more consistent
across countries.  The positive effects emerge within a year in Hungary,
Romania, and Ukraine and continue to grow thereafter, but are still
ambiguous even after 5 years in Russia.  Pre-privatization MFP
exceeds that of firms remaining state-owned in all countries, implying
that cross-sectional estimates overstate privatization effects.  The
patterns of the estimated effects cast doubt on a number of explanations
for ￿when privatization works.￿MŰHELYTANULM`NYOK DISCUSSION PAPERS
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VÆllalati szintű, 11 ￿ 18 Øvet fel￿lelő panel adatokat hasznÆlva nØgy
orszÆg szinte ￿sszes feldolgoz￿ipari vÆllalatÆr￿l, a privatizÆci￿ hatÆ-
sÆt becs￿lj￿k a vÆllalatok termelØkenysØgØre. Regresszi￿inkban ki-
szűrj￿k az időtől f￿ggetlen vÆllalati Øs az Øv-iparÆgi hatÆsokat, hogy
cs￿kkents￿k a privatizÆci￿ esetØben fellØpő szelekci￿s torz￿tÆst.
EredmØnyeink azt sugalljÆk, hogy a rØszvØnyek t￿bbsØgØnek magÆn-
kØzbe juttatÆsa Ætlagosan 28 szÆzalØkkal n￿veli a vÆllalatok teljes
termelØkenysØget RomÆniÆban, 22 szÆzalØkkal MagyarorszÆgon Øs 3
szÆzalØkkal UkrajnÆban, OroszorszÆgban viszont 4 szÆzalØkkal cs￿k-
ken a vÆllalatok termelØkenysØge a privatizÆci￿t k￿vetően. A k￿lf￿ldi
t￿bbsØgi tulajdont eredmØnyező privatizÆci￿ hatÆsa a termelØkeny-
sØgre sokkal nagyobb (Ætlagosan 44 szÆzalØk), Øs sokkal homogØ-
nebb, mint a belf￿ldi magÆnkØzbe juttatÆs hatÆsa. BecslØseink azt is
val￿sz￿nűs￿tik, hogy a privatizÆlt vÆllalatok termelØkenysØge mÆr a
magÆnos￿tÆs előtt magasabb volt, mint a kØsőbb sem magÆnos￿tott
Ællami vÆllalatokØ, amely bizony￿tja a szelekci￿ jelenlØtØt a privatizÆ-
ci￿s folyamatban. A termelØkenysØg dinamikÆjÆt vizsgÆlva kimutat-
juk, hogy a pozit￿v hatÆs mÆr a magÆnos￿tÆst k￿vető első Øvben je-
lentkezik, Øs tovÆbbi n￿vekedØst eredmØnyez a tovÆbbi Øvekben, az
OroszorszÆgban mØrt negat￿v hatÆs viszont elhœz￿dik. BecslØseinket
megismØtelt￿k k￿l￿nb￿ző termelØsi technol￿giÆkat feltØtelezve Øs nØ-
hÆny becslØsi m￿dszert alkalmazva; eredmØnyeink robusztusnak bi-
zonyultak.3
1.  INTRODUCTION
The privatization of tens of thousands of manufacturing firms in Eastern
Europe during the 1990s represents a gigantic experiment in corporate
ownership and performance.  The usefulness of investigating these dramatic
changes derives not only from the large numbers of observations available for
analysis, much larger than those in Western studies, but also from several
additional factors.
1 Unlike the situation in the West, where state-owned
enterprises usually operate in only a few sectors and tend to differ
systematically from other firms, state ownership was indiscriminate during the
socialist period in Eastern Europe, accounting for nearly all productive assets.
The privatization policies adopted in the aftermath of the sudden collapse of
Communist Party control were almost equally indiscriminate, involving rapid
transfers of massive numbers of companies in just a few years, in contrast to
the careful selection and long preparation of firms for privatization typical in
the West. At the same time, most East European countries have retained
significant numbers of firms in state hands, thus providing a useful
comparison group for estimating the impact of ownership change. These
characteristics imply that the impact on firm performance can be treated as
arising in a quasi-experimental situation in which the standard problems in
identifying a privatization effect are mitigated.
The East European setting also offers remarkable variation in the design of
privatization programs and in the broader economic policy and business
environment, all of which carry potential consequences for the effects of
privatization on firm behavior. Variables in privatization design include the
choice of mass privatization techniques versus individual sales, the extent to
which different types of owners acquire shares, and the extent of ownership
concentration resulting from the programs (e.g., Frydman et al., 1993a,
1993b). The policy and business environment includes barriers to competition,
access to finance, macroeconomic stability, security of property rights, and
enforcement of contracts (e.g, EBRD, 1999; Johnson, McMillan, and
                    
1 Megginson and Netter (2001) review Western studies of privatization and some early
studies of the results in transition economies; Djankov and Murrell (2002) discuss
studies in transition economies.4
Woodruff, 2000, 2002; World Bank, 2002). Cross-country variation in these
factors may result in differences in the abilities and incentives of new private
owners to engage in productivity-enhancing restructuring and may thus
account for differences in privatization outcomes.
Despite the attractiveness of this research setting and the inherent scholarly
and policy-oriented interest in these issues, however, there have been
surprisingly few studies that fully exploited the possibilities with a
corresponding research design.  Notwithstanding the large number of
privatized firms in many East European countries and what by now has
become a fairly long time period for analysis, data limitations have prevented
most research from including more than a few hundred firms from a single
country, and few studies have more than three or four annual observations on
each firm.
2 Marshalling only one or two years of both pre- and post-
privatization information, researchers have faced difficulties reliably
identifying a privatization effect and judging pre-privatization differences that
might reflect selection bias in the privatization process.  Some study data only
on privatized firms, thus failing to exploit the possibility of a state enterprise
comparison group. Few have been able to draw on data from more than one
country, rendering it difficult to assess the generality of the results as well as
the effects of the specific privatization design and the broader policy and busi-
ness environment on the privatization-performance relationship.
This paper analyzes the productivity effects of privatization using much longer
time series and more comprehensive coverage than in earlier research. We
have assembled information on manufacturing firms from as early as 1985,
when the Communist Party still held power, until 2002, well after most firms
                    
2 We build on this previous research, including Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (2000), who
study 211 privatized firms in Mongolia from 1990 to 1995; Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer,
and Tsukanova (1996), 452 Russian shops in 1992-1993; Claessens and Djankov (1999),
706 Czech firms, 1992-1997; Claessens and Djankov (2002), large samples in seven
economies, 1992-1995; Djankov (1999), 960 firms in the NIS, 1995￿1997; Earle and
Estrin (1997), 439 Russian firms in 1994; Frydman et al. (1999), 200 privatized Czech,
Hungarian, and Polish firms, 1990￿1993; Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec (1997), about 1000
Slovenian firms, 1989￿1992. More similar to our study in analyzing longer panels,
although each concerns only a single country, are Earle and Telegdy (2002), with 1992-
1999 data in Romania; Lizal and Svejnar (2002), 1992￿1998 in the Czech Republic; and
Orazem and Vodopivec (2003), 1994-2001 in Slovenia. See also Li (1997), who
estimates the effect of reforms on productivity in 272 Chinese firms.5
had been privatized. The data come from four transition economies ￿ Hun-
gary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine ￿ which followed very different policy
strategies and are frequently alleged to have had very different outcomes (e.g.,
World Bank, 1996). Furthermore, the coverage of our data for these four
countries is quite comprehensive, including most manufacturing firms inher-
ited from the former planned economy, both those slated for privatization and
those remaining under state ownership.  In all four countries, comparable fi-
nancial information enables us to estimate multifactor productivity for each
firm on an annual basis, and the ownership data permit a distinction not only
between privatized and state-owned firms but also between firms privatized to
foreign investors and those privatized to domestic companies and individuals;
they also allow us to infer the precise year in which ownership change oc-
curred. Absent a genuinely randomized experiment, these panel data provide a
nearly ideal setting for investigating the relationship between privatization and
productivity.
Our basic aim in this paper is to provide robust estimates of this relationship
using much larger and longer panels than were available to earlier researchers.
Previous studies have also tended to treat productivity as only one of several
possible outcome variables, despite the fact that productivity is both more
convincing as a performance measure than qualitative measures of
restructuring and more closely linked to economic welfare than firm-level
sales, profit, or employment. When productivity has been considered,
attention is frequently limited to either labor productivity or a single
specification of multifactor productivity, and analysis of the latter is often
conditioned on auxiliary assumptions such as constant returns to scale, no
factor bias associated with ownership, no unobserved firm characteristics
correlated with productivity and ownership, and a common technology across
diverse industries. Clearly, the value of the estimates is reduced when such
assumptions are imposed. In this paper, our approach always takes into
account correlated effects (i.e., firm fixed effects) and differences in
production technology across industries, and we provide the results of a
systematic investigation of the robustness of the ownership effects on
productivity across a wide variety of measurement specifications.
In addition to providing robust estimates for each country, we exploit the ad-
vantages of these data to shed light on three issues. The first concerns the ef-
fects of different types of new private ownership structures.  While most
studies tend to find an overall positive impact on performance, the level of6
confidence in the results disaggregated by owner-type is still further reduced
by the small sample size problems described above. Our data, however, con-
tain substantial numbers of observations with both foreign and domestic own-
ership, permitting us to test some common hypotheses about the relative ad-
vantages of each of these types of owner in raising firm performance. On the
other hand, these databases do not contain consistent measures of other own-
ership classifications.
Second, the long-time series in our data permit us to extensively investigate
the dynamics of firm performance before and after privatization. Estimates of
post-privatization dynamics shed light on how quickly any benefits from pri-
vatization are realized and whether they are sustained or tend to diminish over
time.  Estimates of pre-privatization effects are useful for taking into account
possible biases in the selection of firms to be privatized and for assessing the
extent to which anticipation of privatization may affect firm performance.
Pre-privatization performance could either be enhanced as managerial incen-
tives are increased by the expected benefits under new owners, or it could be
diminished as managers see little future with the firm and resort to asset-
stripping. (Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess, 1994; Pinto, Belka, and Krajew-
ski, 1993; Roland and Sekkat, 2000). Either type of behavior would result in a
biased estimate of the privatization effect in a simple comparison of pre- and
post-privatization performance.
The final issue, one which partially subsumes the previous two, concerns
cross-country differences in the effects of privatization. By contrast with
previous studies, which either focus on single countries, pool several
countries￿ data together, or apply meta-analysis to the results from a large
variety of types of studies and data, our investigation of four countries that
have adopted very different reform programs is designed to produce results
that can be compared by covering the same time period, using similar datasets,
and applying the same econometric techniques.
3 We have systematically built
                    
3 Megginson, Nash, and van Randenbourgh (1994) study data on 61 firms in 18 countries;
Boubakri and Cossett (1998), 79 firms in 21 developing countries; and Frydman et al.
(1999), 200 firms in 3 transition economies; but none of these estimates country-specific
privatization effects.  Djankov and Murrell (2002) estimate privatization effects for two
regions (Eastern Europe and CIS) from a meta-analysis of studies that typically rely on
cross-section data (or very short panels) from a wide variety of sources (mostly small
firm surveys and some individual data), use different econometric methods from one
another, and analyze outcomes other than productivity (e.g., sales, new products, wage7
up the database to measure all variables as similarly as possible, in order to
produce greater comparability across countries. Although the sample of
countries is not large enough to permit statistical analysis of the association
between the privatization effects and aspects of the economic environment, the
patterns we find are relevant for the possibility of such associations, which
have been the subject of considerable speculation in previous research.  In
particular, the hypothesis that weak institutions may attenuate any positive
effects of privatization (Anderson, Lee, and Murrell, 2000; Djankov and
Murrell, 2002) suggests that our estimated coefficients should vary
systematically across countries according to the strength of property rights,
enforcement of contracts, and related institutional factors.  We also investigate
the possibilities that the estimated effects reflect the different methods of
privatization and resulting ownership structures, the macroeconomic
environment, and initial relative productivity distributions in the four
countries.
4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data for
the four countries we study, and Section 3 discusses the policy environment
and privatization programs in order to develop hypotheses on the effects of
privatization and how these may vary across countries. Section 4 describes the
estimation procedures, and Section 5 presents results. Conclusions are
summarized in Section 6.
                                                                                                                                                    
arrears, debt default, qualitative restructuring, successful transactions, etc.). We use
nearly universal firm-level data with long time-series and similar variables, focus on
productivity, and apply the same methods to estimate comparable country-specific
effects; these also shed light on regional differences, discussed below.
4 Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs (2001) present an alternative, complementary approach relating
GDP and other measures of macroeconomic performance to the extent of privatization
and other variables in 24 transition economies, although it is questionable whether a
privatization effect can be identified in aggregate data.8
2.  DATA
Our analysis draws upon annual census-type data available for manufacturing
firms in each of the four countries we study. Although the sources and
variables are somewhat similar across countries, considerable effort has been
necessary to prepare and clean the data, to construct longitudinal links, and to
render them sufficiently comparable to justify cross-country comparisons.
This section explains our sources and measures, except for the ownership
variables in our data, which are described in the next section together with our
discussion of privatization policies in these countries.
5
The countries with the most conceptually similar data are Russia and Ukraine,
where common statistical methodologies and data collection mechanisms were
inherited from the Soviet Union. The national statistical offices (Goskomstat
in Russia and Derzhkomstat in Ukraine) are the successors to the branches of
the former Soviet State Committee. The basic sources in these countries are
industrial enterprise registries, supplemented by joint venture registries in
Russia, databases from the State Property Committee and the State Securities
Commission in Ukraine, and balance sheet data in both countries.  The
industrial registries are supposed to include all industrial firms with more than
100 employees plus those that are more than 25 percent owned by the state
and/or by legal entities that are themselves included in the registry.  In fact,
the practice seems to be that once firms enter the registries, they continue to
report even if the original conditions for inclusion are no longer satisfied.  The
data may therefore be taken as corresponding to the ￿old￿ sector of firms (and
their successors) inherited from the Soviet system.  Certainly with respect to
this set of firms, the databases are quite comprehensive. At the beginning of
the transition process in 1992, the firms in the Russian industrial registry
accounted for 91 percent and in Ukraine for 94 percent of officially reported
total industrial employment. The Russian data are available for every year
from 1985 to 2002, and for Ukraine they are available for 1989 and each year
from 1992 to 2002.
The Hungarian and Romanian data tend to be more similar to each other than
to those in the Soviet successor states.  In both cases, the basic data source is
balance sheets and income statements associated with tax reporting: to the
                    
5 A more detailed data appendix is available from the authors upon request.9
National Tax Authority in Hungary and to the Ministry of Finance in
Romania. These data are available for all legal entities engaged in double-
sided bookkeeping, except in Hungary before 1992 ￿ when only a sample
consisting of most firms with at least 20 employees and some smaller firms is
available.
6  In addition, the Romanian data are supplemented by the National
Institute for Statistics￿ enterprise registry and the State Ownership Fund￿s
portfolio and transactions data. The Romanian data contain 95 percent of
reported total manufacturing employment in 1992, and the Hungarian figure,
where entry of new private firms started earlier, is 85 percent. The Hungarian
data are annual from 1986 to 2002, and the Romanian cover 1992 to 2002.
In order to make the samples comparable across countries, some truncation
was necessary. Firms are included if at first observation they operate in an
industrial sector, because the Russian and Ukrainian data do not include non-
industrial firms, and they appear also to exclude industrial firms that were
previously non-industrial. In all four countries, the data are restricted to
manufacturing (NACE 15-36) because some of the nonmanufacturing
industrial sectors (chiefly mining) are defined noncomparably in the Russian
and Ukrainian classification system (OKONKh). The recycling industry
(NACE 37) is excluded because of noncomparability with OKONKh.  We
include only ￿old￿ firms, defined as existing prior to 1992 (1990 in Hungary)
or having any state ownership at first observation, both because the Russian
and Ukrainian data do not cover most de novo firms and because, even if we
could measure them, de novo firms are not at risk of privatization.  Non-profit
organizations in all four countries are excluded, as are firms subordinated to
the State Committee for the Defense Industry after 1998 in Russia. Finally, we
retain firm-years in the sample only when they contain complete information
(nonmissing values for ownership, employment, output, and capital). The total
numbers of firms and their total employment in 1994, as a fraction of all old
firms and their corresponding employment, are shown in Table 1. Missing
values do not reduce the sample greatly in any country, and we have no reason
to expect that the sample is biased in any particular direction. The total
number of firms ever in the sample is 31,798 and the average number of
annual observations per firm is just under ten, making 314,485 firm-years
available for analysis.
                    
6 The coverage before 1992 in Hungary is still quite high:  total employment in the sample












Hungary 1,965 92.5 411,606 98.6
Romania 1,938 87.5 2,401,875 96.0
Russia 14,630 94.1 10,310,400 97.2
Ukraine 5,698 97.4 3,329,037 97.3
Note:  Sample size is expressed in terms of the number of firms, the percent of the
number in all old firms (manufacturing firms inherited from the socialist
period), the total employment in the sample firms, and the percent of sample
employment in all old firm employment.
Summary statistics and definitions for the basic variables used to estimate
productivity ￿ output, capital, and employment ￿ are provided in Table 2. To
save space, we report means and standard deviations only for selected years.
Data on material costs are unfortunately not available for all countries and
years in the data; our specification of production technologies therefore
assumes the only inputs are capital and labor. Reflecting aggregate statistics,
the data imply declining average employment size in all four economies
(although most in Romania), while mean output has fallen through most of the
period everywhere but in Hungary (and Russia and Ukraine since 1999).
Capital stock has also tended to fall in most years, the main exceptions being
recent rises in Russia and Ukraine. This last result is somewhat puzzling, but it
may reflect imperfect deflators that fail to distinguish true price and quantity
changes. Our econometric analysis handles this problem by controlling for a
full set of industry-year interactions.
These data have been extensively cleaned to remove inconsistencies and to
improve longitudinal linkages that may have been broken due to change of
firm identifier from one year to the next (associated with reorganizations and
changes of legal form, for instance). The inconsistencies were evaluated using
information from multiple sources (including not only separate data providers,
but also previous year information available in Romanian balance11
Table 2
 Mean Employment, Capital, and Output, 1986, 1994, and 2002
Employment Capital Output
1986 1994 2002 1986 1994 2002 1986 1994 2002
636 209 166 1,492 1,359 1,077 4,322 2,282 3,591 Hungary
(1,286) (625) (416) (5,295) (20,593) (10,011) (1,075) (24,551) (37,504)
NA 1,002 418 NA 422 115 NA 399 204 Romani
a (2,321) (931) (1,773) (683) (1,756) (1,137)
771 705 514 101 127 160 352 220 214 Russia
(2,595) (2,257) (2,041) (5,536) (7,051) (1,935) (1,293) (1,356) (1,672)
NA 584 469 NA 22 41 NA 21 31 Ukraine
(1,511) (1,895) (105) (240) (124) (222)
Note:  Capital and output are in constant 2002 prices: mln HUF for Hungary, bln ROL for Romania, mln RUB for Russia, and
mln UAH for Ukraine.  Output equals the value of sales for Hungary, the value of gross output for Romania, Russia and Ukraine.
Capital equals average book value of tangible assets between beginning of current and next year for Hungary and Romania,
imputed for missing values as the predicted value of the average capital from a regression on current year capital, year and
industry dummies.  Capital equals average book value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the enterprise, adjusted for
revaluations of year values in Russia and Ukraine.  Employment equals the average number of registered employees for Hungary
and Romania, and average number of registered industrial production personnel in Russia and Ukraine; this measure includes
non-production workers, but excludes ￿nonindustrial￿ employees who mainly provide employee benefits.  Standard deviations
are shown in parentheses.  NA = not available.12
sheets and Russian and Ukrainian registries). The longitudinal linkages were
improved using all available information, including industry, region, size,
multiple sources for the same financial variables, and some exact linking
variables (e.g., firm names and addresses in all countries except Hungary,
where this information was not available) to match firms that exited in a given
year with those that entered in the following year.
7 Although this issue has not
received much attention in previous research, it is clear that accurate and
complete links are crucial to any identification strategy such as ours that
requires observations both before and after privatization. For example, if firms
that change their legal form are systematically different ￿ engaging in greater
restructuring, for example ￿ then it is critical that they not be excluded from
the analysis.
Despite these efforts to clean the data, improve the links, and to make them as
comparable as possible across countries and over time, measurement errors
may still remain. Mismeasurement of productivity ￿ due to errors in output,
capital, or labor ￿ could raise the variance of the estimated productivity effect,
for instance, while mismeasured ownership could bias the effect towards zero.
Reporting practices that vary across ownership types, for example a tendency
for privatized firms to under-report inputs relative to output, could also
produce biased coefficients. Our approach of analyzing a wide variety of
alternative estimation methods is partly motivated by the possibility of such
measurement problems, as well as by a desire to assess the robustness of our
findings. None of the methods, however, can ameliorate the effects of
measurement error entirely, a caveat that should be borne in mind when
evaluating the results.
                    
7 Firms with more than 50 employees were examined for inconsistencies and missing links.
Where they appeared, inconsistencies were resolved following the majority of sources
wherever possible.  When all sources disagreed, the inconsistencies in the largest firms
(more than 500 employees) were resolved through a detailed case-by-case resolution of
mistakes associated with miscodings, misplaced decimals, etc. For smaller firms,
inconsistencies were resolved in favor the ￿preferred source,￿ defined as the source with
the most accurate record based on being more frequently in the majority or more often
correct in case-by-case evaluations.13
3. INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, PRIVATIZATION POLICIES, AND IMPLICATIONS
This section develops hypotheses on the effects of privatization on
productivity, paying particular attention to the relative size of the effects that
may be associated with differences in the economic environment and
privatization program design across countries. We begin with a general
description of reforms in the four countries and how they have been evaluated
by external observers, continue with discussions of privatization program
designs and macroeconomic developments, and conclude by drawing out the
implications for cross-country differences in the effectiveness of privatization
at raising productivity. Table 3 summarizes the differences in privatization
policy designs, reform progress, and the institutional and macroeconomic
environment across the four countries.
REFORMS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The four countries we study in this paper cover the spectrum of transition
economies, at least as conventionally measured in evaluations of ￿progress￿ in
reform and transition by international organizations such as the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The
World Bank￿s (1996) four-group classification of 26 transition economies, for
example, puts Hungary in the first group of leading reformers, Romania in the
second group, Russia in the third, and Ukraine in the fourth. Similarly, the
EBRD￿s annual indicators of ￿progress in transition￿ invariably place Hun-
gary at or close to the top of all transition economies; according to the overall
￿institutional performance￿ measure in EBRD (2000), Hungary is ranked first,
with a score of 3.5 overall. Romania, Russia, and Ukraine are generally placed
much lower, and usually ranked in this same order.
One of the most thorough and well-documented ratings of some aspects of the
institutional environment for business is Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi￿s
(2003) evaluation of the quality of governance worldwide. The results for our
four countries show a similar picture: in 2002, ￿government effectiveness￿ is
rated most highly in Hungary at 0.78 (by comparison, the U.S. has 1.70 and
Singapore and Switzerland both have 2.26), Romania is second at -0.33,
Russia is third at -0.40, and Ukraine is last at -0.74 (by comparison, Haiti has -
1.56 and Sierra Leone -1.54). On a similar scale for ￿regulatory quality,￿
Hungary  receives 1.21 in 2002  (although  this represents  a rapid rise from a14
Table 3
Summary of Country Characteristics
Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
Privatization Policy
Main methods
1 Sales Mixed Insider/mass Insider
Speed
1 Fast Moderate Fast Slow

















EBRD Average Score for Progress in Transtion
4
1994 3.13 2.29 2.43 1.46
2000 3.74 2.84 2.54 2.54
Policy and Business Environment
5
Government Effectiveness 0.78 -0.33 -0.40 -0.74
Regulatory Quality 1.21 0.04 -0.30 -0.62
Rule of Law 0.90 -0.12 -0.78 -0.79
Macroeconomic Environment
6
Industrial Production (average annual growth, %)
1990￿1994 -4.70 -5.87 -15.37 -12.14
1994￿1998 7.83 -1.98 -2.65 -4.72
1998￿2002 9.73 2.11 7.81 9.09
PPI (average annual change, %)
1990￿1994 29.76 177.26 491.48 971.23
1994￿1998 32.73 67.19 46.58 195.99
1998￿2002 21.95 48.77 33.61 10.82
Note: 
1 See discussion in Section 3.  
2 EBRD (1995).  
3 World Bank (1996).  
4 EBRD (1994,
2000).  
5 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003).  
6 Statistical yearbooks for each
country, various years.15
level of 0.47 in 1996), Romania 0.04, Russia -0.30, and Ukraine is again the
laggard at -0.62 (much better than Libya at -1.59 or Uzbekistan at -1.44,
however).  Finally, a similar rating scale for ￿rule of law￿ again finds Hungary
most highly rated, at 0.90 (Finland has 1.99 and the U.S. 1.70), while Romania
follows at -0.12, Russia at -0.78, and Ukraine at -0.79.  Thus all available
evaluations suggest substantial differences in the business and policy
environments across these countries.
PRIVATIZATION POLICY DESIGNS
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) do not evaluate privatization policies,
but the rankings of these countries available from other sources are similar on
this dimension.  EBRD (1995), for example, used a scale from 1 to 4+ to rate
large-scale privatization and other policies of 25 countries.  Hungary￿s score is
￿4,￿ Romania￿s is ￿2.7,￿ Russia receives a ￿3,￿ and Ukraine￿s grade is ￿2.￿
These scores tend to converge somewhat through the 1990s.
In fact, the methods and tempos of large enterprise privatization differed quite
significantly across the four countries. Our evaluations, based on our reading
of a long literature (e.g., Frydman et al., 1993a, 1993b), are also summarized
in Table 3. Hungary got off to an early start in ownership transformation and
maintained a consistent case-by-case method throughout the transition.  At the
very beginning, the transactions tended to be ￿spontaneous,￿ initiated by
managers, who were also usually the beneficiaries, sometimes in combination
with foreign or other investors (Voszka, 1993). From 1991, the sales process
became more regularized, generally relying upon competitive tenders open to
foreign participation. Unlike many other countries, there were no significant
preferences given to workers to acquire shares in their companies, nor was
there a mass distribution of shares aided by vouchers. Hungarian privatization
thus resulted in very little worker ownership, very little dispersed ownership,
and instead concentrated blockholdings, with a large foreign share. Although
the process appeared at times to be slow and gradual, in fact it was
accomplished more quickly than in most other East European countries.
In Romania, by contrast, the early attempts to mimic voucher programs and to
sell individual firms produced few results, and privatization really began only
in late 1993, first with the program of Management and Employee Buyouts,
and secondly with the mass privatization of 1995￿96. The consequences of
these programs were large-scale employee ownership and dispersed16
shareholding by the general population, with little foreign involvement.
Beginning in 1997, greater efforts were made to involve foreign investors, and
blocks of shares were sold both to foreigners and domestic entities. The result
was a mixture of several types of ownership and a moderate speed compared
to neighboring countries.
Russia and Ukraine￿s earliest privatization experiences have some similarities
to the ￿spontaneous￿ period in Hungary, as the central planning system
dissolved in the late 1980s and decision-making power devolved to managers
and work collectives. The provisions for leasing enterprise assets (with
eventual buyout) represented the first organized transactions in 1990-92, but
the big impetus for most industrial enterprise privatization in Russia was the
mass privatization from October 1992 to June 1994, when the bulk of shares
were transferred primarily to the concerned firms￿ managers and workers, who
had received large discounts in the implicit prices they faced (Boycko,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995). Some shares (generally 29 percent) were reserved
for voucher auctions open to any participant, and these resulted in a variety of
ownership structures, from dispersed outsiders holding their shares through
voucher investment funds to domestic investors who acquired significant
blocks; sometimes, managers and workers acquired more shares through this
means, but there were few cases of foreign investment.  Blockholding and
foreign ownership became more significant through later sales of blocks of
shares and through secondary trading that resulted in concentration.  Ukraine
followed Russia￿s pattern at a somewhat slower pace and with even greater
preferences granted to insiders in acquiring shares in their companies.  In both
countries, the initial consequence was large-scale ownership by managers and
workers, some blockholding by domestic entities, and continued state
ownership. Subsequently, blocks formed and foreigners made partial inroads.
These general patterns are reflected in Table 4, which contains our
computations of private ownership, defined here as a strict majority of shares
held in private hands, based on the manufacturing firms in our database.
8
Ownership is measured at the reporting date, the end of each calendar year.
                    
8 The Russian data do not contain an ownership variable prior to 1993, nor, unlike the other
countries, do they distinguish between minority and majority shares, but virtually all the
privatizations in our data are mass privatizations (not lease buyouts), so the earliest they
could have taken place was October 1992, and other sources suggest that nearly all of
these led to majority private ownership (e.g., Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995).17
As of late 1992, 43.0 percent of the Hungarian firms had already been
privatized, while the percentage was only 0.2 in Romania and 0 in Russia and




Percentage of Sample Firms Privatized – Total, Foreign, and Domestic
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Hungary
Private 43.0 68.3 79.5 86.8 91.2 94.2 94.7 94.7 95.7 95.7 96.1
Foreign 9.2 11.8 13.4 15.6 16.7 17.9 18.4 19.1 20.1 20.8 21.6
Domestic 33.8 56.5 66.1 71.2 74.5 76.3 76.3 75.6 75.6 74.9 74.5
Romania
Private 0.2 3.0 8.0 20.3 42.3 46.8 56.1 70.6 79.1 86.4 90.6
Foreign 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.1 2.8 4.2 5.2 5.6 5.9
Domestic 0.2 2.9 7.8 20.1 41.9 45.7 53.3 66.4 73.9 80.8 84.7
Russia
Private 0.0 49.6 84.9 82.7 75.4 75.4 73.9 70.6 69.5 70.2 73.9
Foreign 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.0
Domestic 0.0 49.4 84.5 82.5 75.2 74.9 73.3 70.1 68.9 69.0 72.9
Ukraine
Private 0.0 0.2 8.2 17.7 27.8 45.1 57.2 65.5 68.4 84.2 77.1
Foreign 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.4 0.8
Domestic 0.0 0.2 8.1 17.6 27.6 44.5 56.4 64.6 67.4 82.8 76.3
Note:  ￿Private￿ refers to firms with more than 50% privately held shares. ￿Foreign￿ refers
to privatized firms with more than 50% foreign-owned shares. The residual category
of privatized firms that are not majority foreign is labeled ￿Domestic.￿
                    
9 We assume a single change of ownership and recoded cases of multiple switches to the
modal category after the first change (ties were decided in favor of private and foreign,
unless only two years of data were available).  In Hungary there were 71 cases, in
Romania 15, and in Ukraine 4. Russia had 2,811 firms private since 1995 reclassified as
state in 2000 or 2001; when ownership codes changed drastically; such mass
renationalization did not occur, so our recoding corrects this problem. The nonmono-
tonicity of percent privatized in Table 4, therefore, is due to split-ups of state-owned
firms, which are subject to later privatization and thus included in our sample.18
The table also contains the percentage of firms majority privatized to
foreigners.
10 This fraction is by far the highest in Hungary, reaching nearly 22
percent of all entities by the end of our observation period. In Romania, the
percentage reaches 6 percent, and in Russia and Ukraine about 1 percent,
which given our sample sizes are sufficient to estimate coefficients. The
residual category ￿ the difference between private and foreign ￿ consists of
majority privatized firms that are not majority foreign. Because foreign
investment in these countries usually takes the form of controlling
investments, the residual firms are therefore usually majority owned by
domestic private groups, and we label them ￿domestic￿ in the discussion
below. But some cases of minority foreign investment (particularly in Hun-
gary) are also included in this category.
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Like all the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, the four countries we study in this paper experienced
severe declines in output and bursts of inflation in the early 1990s. Hungary
emerged from recession and reduced inflation most quickly, followed by
Romania, which went back into recession, however, after only a couple years
of growth. Inflation was also more volatile in Romania, which resumed
growth only at the very end of the 1990s.
The magnitude and duration of output decline was greater in Russia than in
either of the two East European economies, and it was still greater in Ukraine.
Both former Soviet Republics experienced severe shocks in 1998-1999
following the Russian default of August 1998, and both have experience
strong growth since then (starting in 1999 in Russia and 2000 in Ukraine),
associated with increases in oil, gas, and commodity prices.  The countries in
our analysis therefore display large variation in macroeconomic conditions
during this period. The patterns of industrial production and producer price
inflation are summarized in Table 3.
                    
10 The Russian registries contain codes for state, domestic, joint ventures, and 100 percent
foreign firms, but foreign shares are available only for a subset of firms in four years.
We classify all joint ventures as foreign, but the results are very similar if we include
only those foreign firms with a majority foreign share in at least one of the four years.19
IMPLICATIONS FOR ESTIMATES OF PRIVATIZATION EFFECTS
What do these substantial differences in institutional environment,
macroeconomic conditions, and privatization design imply for hypotheses on
the effectiveness of privatization in raising productivity? Starting with
privatization policy design, the implications are controversial. Privatization
through transfers to employees has been common in transition economies due
to relative ease of administrative and political implementation, but it has been
criticized as ill-suited to the restructuring demands of the transition.
Employees may lack the necessary skills, capital, access to markets, and
technologies necessary to turn their firms around, and corporate governance
by employees may function particularly poorly when the firm requires
difficult restructuring choices involving disparate distributional impacts within
the firm.
11 Mass and voucher privatization programs were intended to increase
the speed of privatization by overcoming the problems of insufficient demand
due to low domestic savings and reluctance of foreign investors, and if
possible to jump-start domestic equity markets with a rapid release of shares.
But they have sometimes been combined with strong preferences for
employees to use their vouchers in acquiring shares in their employer (for
instance, in Russia and Ukraine), and they typically create highly dispersed
ownership structures, resulting in unmonitored managerial control and ￿
according to some ￿ unfettered asset-stripping.
12  Finally, case-by-case sales
of large blocks of shares is the method usually considered most effective, but
it also has disadvantages: insufficient demand and political difficulties
compounded by problems of valuation, plus the frequent practice of imposing
contractual obligations on future investment and employment that may reduce
restructuring.  Among the types of buyers, foreign owners are likely to have
better access to finance, management skills, new technologies, and knowledge
of markets, which would suggest a higher productivity effect relative to
domestic ownership. On the other hand, foreigners may face special
                    
11 Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) and Lipton and Sachs (1990), for instance, argue
against privatization to employees, while Ellerman (1993), Stiglitz (1999) and
Weitzman (1993) argue in favor.  Earle and Estrin (1996) discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of worker and manager ownership in the transition setting.
12 See, e.g., Stiglitz (1999); Black, Kraakman and Tarrassova (2000); Kornai (2000);
Spicer, McDermott, and Kogut (2000); and Roland (2001).  Proponents of such
programs include Lipton and Sachs (1990), Blanchard et al. (1993), Frydman and
Rapaczynski (1994), and Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994, 1995).20
difficulties restructuring firms when layoff decisions are highly politicized,
and local networks and knowledge of local conditions are nontransparent.
The implications of the policy design for the relative effectiveness of
privatization in raising productivity across countries depend on how one
evaluates these divergent arguments. If privatization works most effectively
when the new owners are concentrated outside investors, and even more so
when they are foreign investors, then we would expect a stronger impact on
enterprise productivity the closer the program comes to producing such
ownership structures, i.e., in Hungary. In order of the importance of
concentrated outsiders and foreign investors, the effect of privatization would
be second largest in Romania, followed by Russia and Ukraine. If instead,
however, insiders are the most effective at restructuring and running their
companies, or if it is the case that an initial privatization to dispersed outsiders
might lead to a better ultimate selection of a controlling owner than would
have resulted from an initial sale of a controlling block, then the implications
could be different, possibly even suggesting that the magnitude of the effect
could decline across our four countries in inverse alphabetical order: Ukraine,
Russia, Romania, and Hungary.
Even if the relative magnitudes of the privatization effects are not reversed,
the consequences of different privatization methods might manifest
themselves differently over time. For example, if concentrated private
ownership is necessary to achieve restructuring, then one would expect to see
more immediate effects from sales to concentrated outsiders than from
voucher or insider privatization, where it takes time for concentrated blocks to
form.  In this case, the major differences across countries could arise in the
timing of the potential benefits from privatization. A possible hypothesis
would be that the speed of the impact of privatization is increasing in the
fraction of sales in all privatization transactions.  The subsequent dynamics of
the privatization effect reflect the possibilities for secondary trading leading to
increased concentration, however, and countries with high initial levels of
inside and dispersed outside ownership initially may tend to catch up so that
the final impact after several years is not very different across countries.
Turning to macroeconomic conditions, it is possible that the effectiveness of
new private owners in restructuring and increasing productivity varies with
price stability and demand conditions. For instance, without reliable price
signals it may be difficult to make choices that improve firm performance. The
comparative advantage of private ownership may be higher when demand21
conditions are strong, and the new owners respond with expansion and
innovation. Alternatively, it is possible that private owners are superior at
cost-cutting in a more constrained environment. In any of these cases, the
estimated privatization may vary due to the large fluctuations in aggregate
inflation and output growth rates across the countries and time periods we
observe.
Concerning the business and policy environment, a natural hypothesis is that
privatization works best in a business environment that protects property
rights and enforces contracts, which private owners require to ensure a return
on their investment and effort (Anderson, Lee, and Murrell, 2000; Black,
Kraakman, and Tarrasova, 2000). In this case, countries with better
institutional ratings should also have the strongest privatization effects.
Similarly, privatization may work better when market signals are clear and
when entrepreneurial opportunities are particularly rife, for instance when
inflation is stable and there is some macroeconomic growth. An alternative
view of the business and policy environment might be that ownership matters
least when the environment functions well, as regulation, competition, and
hard budget constraints serve to discipline firm behavior, and it may be that
any type of firm does well in a good macroeconomic context.  From that point
of view, the institutional and macroeconomic environment could be a
substitute rather than a complement for private ownership.  This argument is
similar to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer￿s (1999) claim that
concentrated ownership is more effective when legal protections are weaker.
The quality of the institutional environment may also affect the dynamics of
the privatization effect.  For example, if better institutions result in faster
development of financial markets that facilitate ownership reallocation and
concentration, then a country with a relatively poor initial ownership structure
but good institutions may tend to start off with a low privatization effect but
then catch up over time. Under the conventional assumption that concentrated
outside ownership is the most likely to deliver productivity improvements,
these arguments imply that the initial differential privatization effect may not
wear off so quickly, and it could even persist, as the same countries that start
with greater ownership concentration would also have the best chances for
further productivity-enhancing reallocation of ownership.
Yet another possibility would be that the nature of the privatization policy de-
sign and the quality of the business and economic policy environment have
offsetting effects. For example, it might be the case that private ownership is22
generally most effective in a poor institutional environment but that
concentrated outside investors tend to have the strongest effect on productivity
in all types of environments. Or perhaps the reverse is true, or perhaps the
factors interact; for instance, inside ownership might be relatively efficacious
in a poor environment and outside ownership might be superior when
institutions function well. In any of these situations, the predicted cross-
country ranking of the coefficient magnitudes becomes ambiguous. How the
effects of privatization vary is ultimately of course an empirical question, one
on which our results below provide evidence.
4.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We follow the broader literature on the effects of privatization in estimating
reduced form equations for firm performance, while trying to account for
potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity bias
(Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Megginson and Netter, 2001). Our goal is to
assess the robustness of the estimated privatization effects to alternative
econometric methods, and therefore our approach to measuring productivity is
eclectic. We investigate the implications of using a wide variety of production
functional forms as well as assumptions of arbitrary production structures.
Separate functions are estimated for each country both to permit functional
forms to vary across countries and to investigate differences in the estimated
privatization effect.  In all estimated equations, we permit the production
technology to vary across industries. Throughout, we include both firm fixed
effects and a full set of industry-year effects, the former to control for firm
characteristics and the latter to control for time-varying industry
characteristics that may be correlated with both ownership and productivity.
Using a model for panel data, in which i indexes firms, j indexes industries,
and t indexes time periods (years), our approach to estimating the privatization
effect simultaneously with the technology parameters takes the following
general expression for each country separately:
yit = Σjfj(kit,lit)*Dj + uit,( 1 )
where  yit  is ln(output), fj is an industry-specific production function, kit  is
ln(capital stock), lit is ln(employment), Dj are industry dummies, and uit is the
residual ￿productivity.￿  Our approach to identifying the effect of privatization
decomposes uit as
uit = ΣjΣtγjtDjDt + ωi + δPrivateit-1 + εit,( 2 )23
where Dt are year effects (10-17 years, varying by country), ωi is a firm fixed
effect, and Privateit-1 is a dummy variable = 1 if the firm is majority privately
owned at the end of the previous year.
13  This specification thus permits
different productivity levels for each industry in each year by including a full
set of industry-year interactions, controlling for any time- and industry-
varying factors, such as price changes not captured by deflators, unmeasured
factors of production, and quality differences that are time-industry-specific.
14
The specification further includes firm fixed effects ωi controlling for the
possibility of correlated effects at the firm level, for instance some aspect of
firm ￿quality￿ correlated with both ownership and productivity but
unobserved in our data. The residual εit includes the effects of measurement
error, specification error, and within-firm and within-industry-year-cell varia-
tion in unmeasured factors of production.
15  Our identifying assumption is that
these components are uncorrelated with firm ownership. The coefficient of
interest is δ, the mean within-country-industry-year difference in MFP
between firms majority private and majority state-owned. Note that (1) and (2)
are estimated in a single step, so that the technology parameters are permitted
to be correlated with ownership.
16
                    
13 Our data do not specify an exact privatization date, and we infer privatization by
observing a change in status from the end of one year to the next.  This implies that the
date on which the new private owners acquire formal authority (i.e., the first post-
privatization shareholders￿ meeting) varies across firms, with some of them already fully
private early in the year we assume is the final pre-privatization year. But some such
assumption is necessary, and we discuss this issue further in connection with the
dynamics of the effect below.
14 We distinguish 10 industry-level production functions based on the trade-off between
disaggregation and number of observations, specifying a minimum of 50 observations
per year per country for each industry.
15 Our analysis of serial correlation in the residuals implies that the process is not a simple
AR(1), and the lagged residuals are frequently significant (with varying signs) up to 4
lags, the patterns differing across countries.  Our estimates therefore permit general
within-firm correlation of residuals using the clustering method first proposed by
Arellano (1987); the standard errors are therefore robust to both serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity, and they do not suffer from the autocorrelation problem of
difference-in-differences estimators discussed by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan
(2004). Kezdi (2003) contains a detailed analysis of autocorrelation and the robust
cluster estimator in panel data models.
16 Conventional Hausman tests always imply the firm fixed effects are statistically
significant in our data, but to test the sensitivity of our results we also estimated the24
We specify the industry-specific technologies fj using a wide variety of
methods and function forms. Among these are the standard Cobb-Douglas and
Translog forms:
Σjfj(kit,lit)*Dj = Σjαjkit*Dj + Σjβjlit*Dj  (3)
Σjfj(kit,lit)*Dj = Σjα1jkit*Dj + Σjβ1jlit*Dj + Σjα2jkit
2*Dj + Σjβ2jlit
2*Dj+ Σjα12jkit*lit*Dj. (4)
The Cobb-Douglas form is estimated several ways:  imposing constant returns
to scale and with free parameters, and instrumenting the factors with their one-
year lagged values and simply as OLS.
We also consider the arguments of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) that unobserved productivity shocks leading to correlation
between factor inputs and the error term can be controlled by including an
investment proxy and other inputs in the equation. Our data lack information
on investment, so our method is to use the first-difference of the capital stock
as proxy for (gross) investment. To the extent this approach is successful, it
controls for the unobserved shock and bias associated with unobserved
factors.  The estimator also uses a control function to account for sample
selection bias due to nonrandom exit. Our exclusion restrictions are similar to
those in Olley and Pakes (1996), relying on higher order polynomials in
investment and capital as these reflect realized productivity and the threshold
of productivity above which firms survive and below which they exit.
17
The estimated output elasticities of capital and labor (for example, αj and βj
from Equation (3)) are provided in Appendix Table A1. The low value for
capital is common in analyses including fixed effects (e.g., Griliches and
Mairesse, 1998), but the correlations of the estimated elasticities tend to be
quite high across methods within countries, although they are less high
(although still nearly always positive) across countries. Considering pairs of
countries, the patterns are interesting: the correlations for Hungary are rather
high with Romania, weaker with Ukraine, and quite weak with Russia; but
they are quite high for Romania both with Russia and with Ukraine, and for
Russia with Ukraine. These patterns presumably reflect the degree of
technological similarity among these countries.
                                                                                                                                                    
privatization effect dropping these fixed effects; the qualitative findings (general
magnitudes and ranking of countries) are very similar to those reported below.
17 We estimate all equations on an unbalanced panel, as Olley and Pakes (1996)
recommend, and we always include firm fixed effects to control for the type of potential
simultaneity bias that is our primary concern, namely in the privatization process.25
A second broad approach to measuring productivity involves the calculation
of ￿Solow residuals,￿ the difference between output and the sum of inputs
weighted by industry factor shares:
SRit = yit - Σj(1-θj)kit*Dj - Σjθjlit*Dj t,( 5 )
where θj is the labor share in industry j. Given that y represents output rather
than value added, θj should be measured as the residual of output less labor
and material input costs, but unfortunately our data lack materials cost
measures on a comparable basis for each country in each year. Therefore, we
investigate the implications of alternative assumed technologies for alternative
values of θj such that 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1. Two extreme cases are labor productivity
(which assumes θj = 1 for all j) and capital productivity (which assumes θj = 0
for all j), while intermediate cases involve alternative specifications of θj. The
estimated  SR calculated on this basis are then regressed on the Privateit-1
dummy, a full set of industry-year effects, and firm fixed effects:
SRit = δPrivateit-1 + ΣjΣtγjtDjDt + ωi + uit.( 6 )
Like all our investigations of different functional forms, specifications, and
methods, these assumed technologies are employed for the purpose of
checking the robustness of our results across a very broad set of alternative
approaches.
18
Each of these methods can be used to estimate the effects of privatization to
foreign and domestic investors. For example, for the analogous specification
given by relations (1) and (2), we have:
yit = Σjfj(kit,lit)*Dj + δfForeignit-1 + δdDomesticit-1 + ΣjΣtγjtDjDt + ωi + εit,(7)
where  Foreignit-1 implies majority foreign ownership,  Domesticit-1 refers to
private firms that are not majority foreign-owned (although they may be partly
foreign, partly domestic, as discussed in the data description), and δf and δd are
the effects of interest. Besides the evident interest in the relative performance
                    
18 Our data do not contain any information that would be useful for instrumenting
ownership; both pre-privatization performance and aspects of the privatization process
(e.g. Earle and Estrin, 1997) are correlated with investor interest and future
performance.26
of these two ownership types, this analysis permits us to address the
hypothesis that the large cross-country differences in the relative share of
privatization to foreign investors may help account for the differences in the
estimated homogeneous privatization effect.
We also investigate the dynamics of the privatization effect before and after
privatization takes place. Our motivation is threefold:  first, examining pre-
privatization dynamics provides information on whether firms were already
improving productivity prior to the ownership change. Such a finding could be
interpreted as the result of some dynamic selection bias that our fixed effects
methods do not account for, or it could be associated with changed incentives
in anticipation of privatization; such anticipatory effects could be positive if
they reflect career concerns of managers hoping either to show new owners
their skills or   to acquire their companies themselves, or they could be
negative if the expectation of post-privatization loss of control ￿ or of job ￿
leads to increased asset-stripping (Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess, 1994;
Roland and Sekkat, 2000).  Second, examining post-privatization dynamics is
useful for ascertaining the speed with which any estimated effect occurs:  is
the effect immediate or gradual, becoming significant only with a long lag?
Does it tend to be a single jump in productivity, or is it more sustained, with a
series of increases over several years? Is it only temporary, as state firms tend
to catch up, or does the effect appear to be permanent?  Third, the dynamics of
the privatization effect may provide some help in understanding cross-country
differences.  As discussed in the previous section, the cumulative size of the
effect could be similar in all countries while the speed of the effect differs, or
the reverse could be true.
We implement this estimation of dynamics by interacting dummy variables for
the years before and after privatization with Privateit. The privatization year
(where  Privateit-1 = 0 and Privateit = 1) is omitted, so that all effects are
calculated relative to productivity in that year. The first through fourth pre-
privatization years are indicated by PrePriv1it,  PrePriv2it,  PrePriv3it, and
PrePriv4it, respectively, while the fifth pre-privatization and earlier years are
combined into a single variable PrePriv5it. The post-privatization variables are
defined analogously, with the labels PostPriv1it ￿ PostPriv5it. Thus specified,
the equation becomes:
yit = Σjαjkit*Dj + Σjβjlit*Dj
+ π-5PrePriv5it + π-4PrePriv4it + π-3PrePriv3it+ π-2PrePriv2it  + π-1PrePriv1it27
+ π1PostPriv1it + π2PostPriv2it + π3PostPriv3it + π4PostPriv4it + π5PostPriv5it
+ ΣjΣtγjtDjDt + ωi + νit,( 8 )
where π-5 measures the average productivity effect among firms five or more
years prior to their privatization, π1 measures the average productivity effect
among firms during the first year after privatization, etc., permitting an
evaluation of the dynamics of changing productivity in firms as they go
through the privatization process. We also compute these for foreign and
domestic ownership and report the estimated π resulting from these analyses in
graphical form below.
We conduct a number of additional exercises to try to account for cross-
country differences in the estimated privatization effect. Motivated by the
possibility that the impact of privatization varies with firm quality (which may
also vary across countries), we examine pre-privatization productivity levels,
relative to state-owned firms. We also interact the firm￿s relative productivity
in the year before privatization with the privatization effect, allowing a very
general form for this relationship by specifying relative pre-privatization
productivity as a quartic. Variation over time in the quality of firms selected
for privatization and in the methods employed are investigated with a similar
equation that permits the privatization effect to vary with year of privatization
(cohort). The possibility that macroeconomic conditions and the business
environment may influence the effectiveness of privatization is examined by
allowing the privatization coefficient to vary with calendar years. The specific
hypothesis that new private owners may be more responsive than the state to
opportunities for growth is tested by interacting privatization with output
growth in the 2-digit industry. Finally, we investigate compositional effects
associated with variation in the industrial structure across countries and in the
privatization effect across industries. The methodology used in each of these
extensions is described in greater detail with the results, below.
5.  RESULTS
We begin with the basic results from estimation of the average privatization
effect  δ  for each country, and then continue with estimates of the foreign
effect  δf and the domestic effect δd. Next we report our estimates of the
dynamics of these effects for several years before and after the privatization28
date.  The final set of results provides several extensions organized around
potential explanations of the cross-country differences in our estimates of the
basic privatization effects.
BASIC ESTIMATES
As discussed in the previous section, we consider a wide variety of alternative
specifications of technology in estimating the effect of privatization on
multifactor productivity. Table 5 includes results from three Cobb-Douglas
functions (OLS, IV, and Olley-Pakes estimators) for Equation (1) and from
two assumptions about the labor share in a Solow residual measure (θ = 1 and
θ = 0.7) for Equation (5).  The estimated δs from some other specifications of
Equations (1) and (5) ￿ including a Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to
scale imposed, a translog, and some other assumed technologies (θ = 0.0, 0.3,
0.5) ￿ are reported in Table A2.
Regardless of specification and econometric method, the estimated δs are
positive and highly statistically significant in Hungary and Romania. The
magnitudes vary somewhat across specifications, but the Romanian point
estimate, which lies between 0.20 and 0.36, always exceeds the Hungarian,
between 0.14 and 0.31. The 95-percent confidence intervals around the
estimates are overlapping in 2 of the specifications in Table 5, while they do
not overlap in the other 3 cases. If we compute the mean estimated effects
(and standard errors) across all 10 estimation methods in Tables 5 and A2, we
obtain 0.225(0.026) for Hungary and 0.288(0.027) for Romania.
By contrast, the estimated δs for the two former Soviet Republics are much
lower. In Ukraine, the point estimates are uniformly positive, but they are
small in magnitude, lying in the range from 0.02 to 0.06, and they are not
always significantly different from zero. In Russia, the point estimates are al-
most always negative, and while the magnitudes are not large (from -0.07 to
0.002), they tend to be precisely estimated. Even more than in Hungary and
Romania, the magnitudes vary little across specifications and methods.
Table 5
Estimated Productivity Effects of Privatization
Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
CD-OLS29
δ￿ 0.222** 0.250** -0.047** 0.044*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019)
R
2 0.649 0.693 0.707 0.600
N 21,977 21,461 213,447 57,600
CD-IV
δ￿ 0.140** 0.241** -0.041** 0.030*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.013)
R
2 0.662 0.694 0.701 0.519
N 19,118 18,154 184,353 48,054
Olley-Pakes
δ￿ 0.154** 0.200** -0.070** 0.035
(0.031) (0.025) (0.016) (0.019)
R
2 0.674 0.703 0.702 0.521
N 19,118 18,154 184,353 48,054
Assuming θ = 1.0
δ￿ 0.214** 0.301** -0.060** 0.058**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.017) (0.020)
R
2 0.804 0.671 0.772 0.706
N 21,977 21,461 213,447 57,600
Assuming θ = 0.7
δ￿ 0.243** 0.318** -0.041* 0.046*
(0.024) (0.028) (0.018) (0.020)
R
2 0.737 0.631 0.745 0.698
N 21,977 21,461 213,447 57,600
Note:  Coefficients (standard errors) are shown for Private (= 1 if the firm is majority
private at the end of year t-1).  Firm fixed effects and full sets of unrestricted
industry-year dummies are included in all regressions.  CD=Cobb-Douglas; θ =
assumed labor share; see text for other explanations. Standard errors are adjusted
for clustering on firms.  * = significant at 5-percent level.  ** = significant at 1-
percent level.
The mean estimated effects (mean standard errors) across all 10 estimation
methods are -0.041(0.017) for Russia and 0.040(0.019) for Ukraine.
19
                    
19 The results of regressions on pooled data for Hungary and Romania and for Russia and
Ukraine allowing all coefficients to vary by country suggest that the differences of  the
δs are usually statistically significant.30
We find, therefore, robust evidence of large differences in the estimated
privatization effect across the four countries in our sample. The implied
ranking of countries by the magnitude of the effect, however, follows neither
the alphabetic nor reverse alphabetic ordering suggested by some of the
hypotheses in Section 2 above. While the effect is clearly larger in the two
former Soviet ￿satellites￿ than in the two former Soviet member states, the
ranking within these groups is rather surprising: the evidence implies a
somewhat larger effect in Romania than Hungary, and in Ukraine relative to
Russia. A constant theme in the rest of what follows, therefore, is the question
of what factors might account for these cross-country differences.
FOREIGN VERSUS DOMESTIC OWNERSHIP
A first potential explanation for the cross-country differences involves the
type of new private ownership, whether foreign or domestic. If the effects of
these two types differ, then the different shares of foreign and domestic
privatization (Table 4) would imply different average privatization effects
across countries. Table 6 therefore reports similar specifications to Table 5,
and Appendix Table A2 contains specifications where the privatization effect
is permitted to vary between these two ownership types.
In all four countries, we estimate the foreign privatization effect δf to be large
and highly significant. The magnitudes are remarkably similar to each other,
nearly all in the range from 0.37 to 0.50. The mean(standard error) of the
estimated effects across the 10 methods in Tables 6 and A3 is 0.481(0.052) for
Hungary, 0.395(0.094) for Romania, 0.386(0.152) for Russia, and
0.431(0.156) for Ukraine. Not only is this an important result in its own right,
but our finding of consistently high foreign effects has implications for some
potential explanations of cross-country differences in the average privatization
effect. In particular, it casts doubt on accounts that stress the importance of the
macroeconomic and business environments, as foreign-owned f irms  may  be
equally  subject to macroeconomic volatility and poor
Table 6
Estimated Effects of Foreign and Domestic Privatization
Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
CD-OLS
δ￿ f 0.529** 0.400** 0.400** 0.408**
(0.050) (0.094) (0.154) (0.158)31
δ￿ d 0.187** 0.241** -0.048** 0.044*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.020)
N2 1 ,976 21,461 213,447 56,892
CD-IV
δ￿ f 0.369** 0.365** 0.414** 0.453**
(0.030) (0.045) (0.049) (0.072)
δ￿ d 0.116** 0.233** -0.043** 0.032**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013)
N1 9 ,118 18,154 184,353 46,705
Olley-Pakes
δ￿ f 0.399** 0.268** 0.409** 0.453**
(0.054) (0.093) (0.162) (0.161)
δ￿ d 0.117** 0.195** -0.072** 0.038*
(0.030) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020)
N1 9 ,118 18,154 184,353 46,705
Assuming θ = 1.0
δ￿ f 0.545** 0.460** 0.436** 0.482**
(0.053) (0.094) (0.161) (0.158)
δ￿ d 0.179** 0.290** -0.061** 0.057**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.017) (0.020)
N2 1 ,976 21,461 213,447 56,892
Assuming θ = 0.7
δ￿ f 0.513** 0.433** 0.390* 0.446**
(0.048) (0.095) (0.161) (0.164)
δ￿ d 0.215** 0.310** -0.043 0.047*
(0.024) (0.028) (0.018) (0.021)
N2 1 ,976 21,461 213,447 57,600
Note:  Coefficients (standard errors) are shown for Foreign (= 1 if the majority of the firm￿s
shares are owned by foreigners in year t-1) and Domestic (= 1 if the firm was private in year
t-1 but not majority-owned by foreigners).  Firm fixed effects and full sets of unrestricted
industry-year dummies are included in all regressions.  CD=Cobb-Douglas; θ =assumed la-
bor share; see text for other explanations.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on
firms.
* = significant at 5-percent level. ** = significant at 1-percent level.
business environment.
20 Indeed, concerning the latter, foreign owners may
even be relatively disadvantaged by lack of inside knowledge to cope with
                    
20 If foreign firms were concentrated in few regions with unusual characteristics (such as a
superior business environment), then this inference could be incorrect, but in fact the
foreign firms in our data are quite dispersed. The highest percentage of a country￿s32
bureaucracy and corruption. The evidence is far from decisive, of course, but
it is suggestive that the source of cross-country differences should be sought
elsewhere.
The uniformly high estimate of the foreign privatization effect implies that the
effects of domestic privatization vary widely, and our results provide direct
confirmation of this reasoning. Again, we find positive and statistically
significant effects for both Hungary and Romania, but the δds in Hungary are
reduced relative to the overall privatization effects shown in Table 5. As a
consequence, the difference between the estimated effects in Hungary and
Romania is slightly greater than before:  while the difference in estimated δs
in Table 5 varies from 0.03 to 0.10 across specifications, the difference in the
δds in Table 6 lie in the range 0.06 to 0.12. Because of the very small foreign
shares in Russia and Ukraine, the domestic effects have only marginally
smaller estimates than the average privatization effects we have already seen.
The mean estimated domestic effect(standard error) is 0.197(0.027) for Hun-
gary, 0.280(0.028) for Romania, -0.043(0.017) for Russia, and 0.043(0.021)
for Ukraine.
21
How much does the varying foreign-domestic composition of privatization
contribute to the cross-country differences we have estimated in the average
privatization effect?  An interesting counterfactual question is how the δs in
the three countries with relatively little foreign ownership ￿ Romania, Russia,
and Ukraine ￿ would be changed if they had Hungary￿s larger foreign
ownership share (but kept their own estimated foreign and domestic
privatization effects). In Romania, this would increase the average
privatization effect by only about a percentage point, but imposing the
Hungarian foreign ownership share in Russia and Ukraine would raise their δs
by about 5 percentage points. This difference would be enough to make the
average effect in Russia almost exactly zero (i.e., even if Russia had imported as
much foreign capital in proportion to size as did Hungary) and to raise that in
Ukraine to close to 10 percent.  Correspondingly, if we impose the Russian
foreign ownership share on Hungary, the Hungarian δ falls by about 0.04.
                                                                                                                                                    
foreign firms in any one region is in Hungary (30.5 percent in Budapest), while no reg-
ion has more than 13 percent in the other countries.
21 The results of regressions on pooled data (allowing the factor coefficients and industry-
year effects to vary across countries) for Hungary and Romania and for Russia and
Ukraine suggest that the differences between the δfs are statistically insignificant, while
the differences in the δds are usually significant at the one percent level.33
We find, therefore, that the large differences in foreign share, combined with the
significant advantage of foreign over domestic ownership in all four countries,
can explain only a relatively small part of some of the differences in estimated δ
across countries: namely, about 5 percentage points of the difference between the
East European countries and the former Soviet Republics. It does not explain
why the Romanian δ is greater than the Hungarian, and indeed it deepens this
puzzle, because under this counterfactual the gap between the estimated
Romanian and Hungarian domestic effect δd becomes even wider.  In most of the
extension below, therefore, we focus on results for δd.
DYNAMICS
We turn next to dynamics of the privatization effects around the privatization
date. As discussed in Section 3, examining the development of the post-
privatization effects may shed light on the possibility that the estimated cross-
country differences result from a slower emergence of the positive effects of
privatization in some countries compared to others. A slower impact might
occur, for instance, if the initial post-privatization ownership structure is
highly dispersed so that concentration through secondary transactions is
necessary before any productivity-enhancing restructuring can be realized.
Our specification of Equation (8), as discussed in detail in the previous
section, also permits us to assess the temporariness or permanence of the
impact of privatization as well as the possibility of selection effects or
anticipatory incentive effects in pre-privatization behavior (which, as we
noted, could be either positive or negative, reflecting either career concerns or
asset-stripping). The temporal variation in effects relative to the year of
privatization of the private ownership, foreign ownership, and domestic
ownership effects, based on the π coefficients in this equation, are shown in
Figures 1￿3.
22
                    
22 These results and the rest of those reported in the text rely on the basic Cobb-Douglas
production function, but the results differ only trivially when we employ alternative
specifications of technology.34
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The estimation results for the average privatization effect are graphed in
Figure 1, with the horizontal axis indicating the number of years before and
after privatization, and the magnitude of the effect (relative to productivity in
the privatization year, denoted ￿0￿) on the vertical.  In Hungary, Romania, and
Ukraine, the privatization effect grows fairly continuously after privatization,
although with some variation in slope. In Russia, however, it is negative and
declines for several years, with some upturn starting only very late ￿ in the
five and more years after privatization. The dynamics of the domestic effect
tell a fairly similar story, but the post-privatization profile for the foreign
effect is steadily increasing ￿ aside from a couple wobbles in the data ￿ in all
four countries. Our results imply that the large overall foreign effect is the
result of not only rapid but sustained relative productivity growth in these
firms.
The post-privatization dynamics, therefore, do not appear to help us to
understand cross-country differences in the estimated domestic privatization36
effect as resulting from differences in how quickly the effect emerges across
countries. Counterfactual calculations assuming different timing of the
privatization process actually work in the opposite direction: if Romania had
privatized as quickly as Hungary, its privatization effect would be still larger,
and the same is true for the Ukraine-Russia comparison. A further implication
of these results is that the longer run effect of privatization in Hungary,
Romania, and Ukraine would be greatly understated by research using data
with information through only the first year or two after privatization, while in
Russia it would be overstated, at least through four years after privatization
had taken place.
The dynamics in the pre-privatization period also warrant close attention.
While rather flat for δ and δd in Russia and Ukraine, the trends in Hungary and
Romania are already positive well before the privatization year. As we have
pointed out, such pre-privatization increases could reflect the selection of
firms for privatization with higher growth potential, or they could reflect
enhanced incentives among managers expecting privatization in the future.
Arguing for the first interpretation is the fact that the increases begin several
years before privatization actually happens, but arguing for the second is the
fact of sizable jumps in both countries immediately around the privatization
year.
23  Unfortunately, in the absence of an experiment (a random allocation of
privatization) we have no way of eliminating selection bias completely, but we
do find the large, roughly contemporaneous jumps suggestive that more than
selection is at work and that privatization has had a real impact.
24
                    
23 Recall that our basic specifications (1) and (5) define the private effect with respect to
ownership at the end of the previous year, Privateit-1, because the ownership information
is annual.  As we pointed out, some firms could be privatized early in the year, resulting
in a possible misattribution of the productivity effect that year to the pre-privatization
period.  The results here imply that if we instead used contemporaneous Privateit, the
estimated δ would be higher in Hungary and Romania, in both cases by about 0.03, but
the difference between them would remain about the same (because even though the
Hungarian jump from year -1 to year 0 is greater, the jump receives a smaller weight
than in Romania, where there are fewer post-privatization years. Using
contemporaneous ownership would also produce a bigger gap between the estimated δs
in the two East European countries relative to Russia and Ukraine, because the latter
would be unaffected.
24 Alternatively, the possibility of anticipatory behavior could be eliminated if privatization
had been completely unforeseen, but this is difficult to believe in the context of the huge
public debates over privatization policies taking place in these countries during this37
The pre-privatization dynamics are fairly similar for foreign and domestic
privatizations in Hungary and Romania: in all cases in these countries, the
trend is positive, although the slope is larger for Hungarian firms eventually
sold to foreigners than to domestic agents, while the reverse is true for
Romania.  But the dynamics are very different in the comparison of foreign
versus domestic privatizations in both Russia and Ukraine. In the former
Soviet Republics, the trends are clearly downwards in the two years preceding
sales to foreigners (while, as we noted, these were flat for domestic
privatizations). A possible interpretation of these patterns would focus on pre-
privatization incentives of managers: in foreign privatizations in Russia and
Ukraine, managers may have expected they would be quickly replaced and
thus had little to lose and everything to gain from asset-stripping in a nebulous
property rights environment; while the flat pre-privatization profiles in the
domestic privatizations could result from majority ownership usually going to
workers and managers, resulting in little incentive to either improve
performance to demonstrate their skills or to strip assets in the run-up to
privatization. The sharply positive pre-privatization trend in Hungary for firms
sold to foreign investors is consistent with the strong role of Hungarian
managers in the privatization process, discussed in Section 3, providing them
with incentives to prove their worth to their anticipated new partners and with
more certainty that they would stay on the job. The more moderate trend for
Romanian firms sold to foreigners may indicate an intermediate situation
between managers￿ expectations of high probability of replacement in Russia
and Ukraine and relatively low probability in Hungary.
EXTENSIONS
This sub-section considers a number of extensions to the basic estimates.  The
analysis is organized around potential explanations for the cross-country
differences in the the privatization effects, although most of the extensions
also have wider implications.  We begin with a further discussion of pre-
privatization differences in the quality of firms slated for privatization, relative
to firms remaining state-owned, and continue with analysis of the extent to
                                                                                                                                                    
period. It should also be noted that even finding a flat profile of pre-privatization
productivity does not eliminate all possibility of selection bias, as potential investors
could have information on growth potential that is unobserved in our data, although if
such information concerns the industry rather than the firm, the industry-year interaction
effects in our equations would control for it.38
which the estimated privatization effect varies with pre-privatization
productivity level, year of privatization (cohort), calendar year, and industry
growth rate. Finally, we examine possible composition effects in the cross-
country differences. Most of the discussion is focused on the domestic effects
because, as we have seen, the foreign effects are uniformly positive and of
relatively similar magnitude across the four countries, while the domestic
effects vary widely. Furthermore, for some of the analyses, the number of
observations on foreign ownership is too small  to permit confident
conclusions.
Our examination of dynamics, above, highlighted cross-country differences in
the pre-privatization evolution of productivity in firms slated for privatization.
These different patterns could be related to a possible explanation for the
cross-country differences in the privatization effect: policies that tend to select
￿better￿ or ￿worse￿ firms for privatization. As we noted in Section 3, the
privatization policies in these countries were fairly indiscriminate, but each
government has retained a significant number of firms in majority state
ownership. If, for example, more productive firms are more likely to be
privatized, then a simple cross-sectional comparison of state-owned versus
privatized firm performance will lead to incorrect inferences about the effect
of privatization. To gauge possible differences across countries in relative
quality of firms slated for privatization, Table 7 provides estimates of pre-
privatization productivity relative to state firms.
25 The pre-privatization
advantage is estimated to be large in all four economies, ranging from 0.11 in
Ukraine to 0.32 in Romania. For foreign privatization, the range is from 0.27
in Ukraine to 0.43 in Romania, while for domestic it is 0.11 to 0.31.  These
results imply that firms selected for privatization in all four countries are more
productive than those kept in state hands, on average, and thus that there is
positive selection in the privatization process. Studies that rely only on cross-
section data or that use longitudinal data but fail to control for fixed
differences between firms are likely to overstate the benefits of privatization.
26
This result is particularly salient for foreign privatizations, although it applies
to domestic ownership as well.
                    
25 These results are computed as the coefficients on group effects (replacing the firm fixed
effects) for ￿ever privatized￿ in Equation (1) and for ￿ever foreign￿ and ￿ever domestic￿
in Equation (7).
26 For instance, this may account for the positive effects estimated by Earle and Estrin
(1997), who analyze a cross-section Russian enterprise sample in 1994.39
Table 7
Pre-Privatization Relative Productivity

























Note:  The pre-privatization productivity of firms subsequently privatized relative to
enterprises always in state ownership is estimated as the coefficient on a group
effect, Ever Private, in a production function including Private, capital, labor, and
industry-year interactions. The Ever Foreign and Ever Domestic effects are
estimated analogously in an equation disaggregating Private into Foreign and
Domestic.
Our estimation method in this paper controls for pre-privatization productivity
differences through the use of firm fixed effects, of course, but could such
differences affect the subsequent, post-privatization potential for productivity
to be improved?  In other words, could the privatization effect be
heterogeneous in the level of pre-privatization productivity? For example, it
might be easier to restructure and improve the productivity of firms with
relatively low productivity, or the opposite could hold.  If such a relationship
exists, and if pre-privatization productivity varies across countries, then this
provides another possible explanation for the stark cross-country differences
we have documented. To assess this, we re-estimate interacting δd with a
quartic function of pre-privatization productivity, which is measured relative
to productivity in state-owned firms in the same industry and in the year
immediately prior to privatization.
27 The results are plotted in Figure 4, where,
for ease of comparison across countries, pre-privatization productivity has
                    
27 We focus on the domestic privatization effect δd here because it varies sharply across
countries, while the foreign effect δf varies comparatively little. Moreover, there are too
few observations on foreign-owned firms in Russia and Ukraine for us to estimate many
types of heterogeneity in these effects.40
been normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation, and the range
constrained to [-2, +2].























Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
The results suggest a substantial negative effect in Hungary and Romania,
implying that the effectiveness of privatization in raising productivity is
negatively related to position in the pre-privatization productivity distribution.
The profiles for these two countries are rather similar to one another, with an
estimated domestic privatization effect about 0.6 greater for firms at the
bottom of the distribution compared with those near the top.
28  But those for
Russia and Ukraine are quite different ￿ although similar to each other ￿ in
showing a relatively flat relationship. The Russian profile curves slightly
downwards in the middle of the distribution, while the Ukrainian curves
                    
28 We have also calculated the pre-privatization productivity interactions for δf in Hungary
and Romania, which have sufficient observations, and these have similar shape ￿ falling
about 0.6 over the productivity distribution.41
slightly upward, but the range of variation is quite small (practically always
between -0.1 and +0.1), certainly in comparison with Hungary and Romania.
29
These findings cannot account for different privatization effects for the two
East European countries versus the two former Soviet Republics, but could
they explain the difference between Hungary and Romania? Suppose that
Romanian firms are, on average, less productive than Hungarian firms by a
third of a standard deviation of productivity in the joint productivity
distribution for the two countries. Then the effect of privatization on
Romanian firms would be higher on average by about 0.05, which is
approximately the difference we found in Tables 5 and 6.
30  The problem with
actually measuring relative productivity is that it requires an assumption about
the appropriate exchange rate ￿ and for much of the period there are problems
in choosing or calculating the correct rate due to  high inflation in one or both
countries, and officially fixed rates that may have borne little relationship with
market prices. Nevertheless, if we estimate relative productivity using the
average annual ￿market exchange rates￿ reported in the International Financi-
al Statistics (IMF, 2004), we find that Romanian firms are less productive than
Hungarian by 27.7 percent of one standard deviation of their joint productivity
distribution.
31 Thus, a greater impact on less productive firms, combined with
cross-country differences in average productivity, may partially account for
the higher estimated privatization effect in Romania compared with Hungary.
But why the effect does not vary with pre-privatization productivity in Russia
and Ukraine is unclear, and this analysis does not help explain the difference
in privatization effects between the latter two countries.
Another possible source of variation in firm quality, and therefore possibly in
the estimated privatization effect, could be differences over time in the
                    
29 The negative relationship together with the relative pre-privatization productivity level
(in Table 7) implies that the expected improvement is negatively correlated with the
probability of becoming privatized.
30 These calculations assume an approximately linear relationship in Figure 4, with a
negative slope of about
-0.15, which is close to what we observe for these two countries.
31 This estimate results from a pooled regression of Hungarian and Romanian data for
1992-2002 (years common to both countries in our data), with all monetary values in
HUF2002, and with a specification similar to Equation (1):  capital and labor
coefficients vary across industries (but not countries), and industry-year interactions are
included.42
selection of firms for privatization and in the methods used.  The selection
process could have been influenced by information about growth potential that
is unobservable with our data (but observed to potential buyers or to the
privatization agency), there might have been some learning process that
improved the privatization process with greater experience, and there could
have been some systematic variation over time in the methods that were used
￿ which as we have discussed was quite pronounced in Romania, for instance.
To assess the possibility of fluctuation of privatization effect by cohort, we
permitted δd to vary with the year in which privatization took place, and the
results are graphed in Figure 5.
32
















Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
The figure shows little systematic variation in the effectiveness of
privatization by cohort that might be useful for interpreting the cross-country
                    
32 Again, our main focus is investigating alternative explanations for the sharp cross-
country differences in δd, and there are too few foreign observations to permit a
systematic analysis of the variation in δf by cohort.43
differences, although they are somewhat consistent with differences in
privatization method within countries. Romania is an apt case because of the
high correlation of cohort with time, as described in Section 3. The figure
shows that the Romanian δd increases from about 0.21-0.24 in 1994-1996 to
0.32 in 1997-1998, which would be consistent both with learning by the State
Ownership Fund and with the large number of sales privatizations that started
in 1997, after the insider buyouts of 1994-1995 and mass privatization of
1996. After 1998, δd tend to fall somewhat, but this could be partly due to the
systematic tendency to observe earlier post-privatization years for more recent
cohorts.  In fact, the magnitude of the fall is reduced if we include a variable
representing the length of time since privatization occurred, although the
decline is still somewhat puzzling.
33  In any case, we find similar or larger
privatization effects in Romania compared to Hungary in 1994-1996 and
larger effects in later years. Therefore, it does not appear to be the case that
our finding of a higher δd for Romania than Hungary is driven by the most
recent years, when Romania ￿ like Hungary earlier ￿ largely pursued sales
privatizations.
The pattern of cohort effects in Russia is also suggestive of the differences in
privatization methods used over time. Unfortunately, the later period does not
contain many observations, so we are forced to pool the years after 1995, but
the pattern is nevertheless clear in the data.
34  Later cohorts, representing the
so-called ￿second wave￿ privatizations, when sales became much more
common, tend to have much higher estimated effects than those in 1993-1994,
which were dominated by insider privatization. For Ukraine, however, the
pattern is just the opposite, as the estimated domestic privatization effect falls
steadily from 1996 to 2000, even though sales methods were becoming more
common during this period. Moreover, the higher estimated effect of domestic
privatization in Ukraine compared to Russia is driven mostly by the higher
cohort effects in 1993-1994, when both countries pursued insider privatization
                    
33 In this case, the cohort effect drops by 0.07 from 1998 to 2000; the difference is no
longer statistically significant.
34 There are 85 privatizations from 1995 to 2001 in our Russian data.  If we disaggregate
this period by years, then for the 3 years with at least 15 privatizations we find a
suggestive pattern of an increasing effect (0.14 in 1995, 0.16 in 1997, and 0.35 in 1998),
but the datapoints in this analysis are too few to permit strong conclusions.44
almost exclusively.
35  Thus, while the patterns of cohort effects are mostly
consistent with within-country variation in privatization methods over time,
they do not appear very helpful in explaining the differences across countries.
Regardless of the particular year in which a firm was privatized, the
productivity consequences of privatization could vary over time because of
changes in the macroeconomic or business environment, as discussed in
Section 3. To assess this possibility, we permit δd to vary by calendar year, and
the results are graphed in Figure 6. Again, it is difficult to see any systematic
variation, however. In Romania, the effect increases fairly steadily, which is
consistent with improvements in the business environment but not with the
macroeconomic volatility, including a second sharp recession, that Romania
experienced during this period.


















Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
The other countries show little trend over the whole period, except for some
slight suggestion of a small decline in Hungary. The fluctuations, moreover,
                    
35 These basic trends are again little affected if we control for length of time since
privatization.45
are not consistent with macroeconomic changes, for instance the 1995
stabilization program in Hungary. In fact, despite similar macroeconomic
trends and shocks over these years, the Russian and Ukrainian effects appear
in the figure as mirror images. While the rise in the Russian number from
1998 to 2001 seems to reflect economic recovery from the 1998 crisis, the
Ukrainian figures trend downwards over the same years, unaccountably
jumping substantially only in the last year in our sample, 2002. Like our
earlier finding that the foreign ownership effect is uniformly high in all four
countries, therefore, this analysis provides little support for the hypothesis that
the business environment and macroeconomy affects the productivity gains
from privatization.
36
While the coefficients on year-ownership interactions appear to be completely
uncorrelated with both inflation and aggregate output growth, a possible
objection is that the variation in business conditions summarized by these
interactions is too crude to capture relevant conditions at the firm-level. We
therefore investigate heterogeneity in the domestic privatization effect with
respect to growth in the firm￿s 2-digit NACE industry. Growth for this
purpose is defined as x = (Xt￿Xt-1)/.5(Xt+Xt-1), where Xt is real output in year t,
which makes x symmetric (and bounds it in the range [-2,+2]). We include x in
Equation (1) as a quartic interacted with Domestic. The results for x over the
range [-0.5,+0.5] (because of the very small number of observations on
industry growth outside this range) are plotted in Figure 7.
The results do not appear capable of helping to account for cross-country
differences in the estimated privatization effect. The plot is uniformly highest
for Romania and second-highest for Hungary; the former trends mildly
upwards and the latter slightly downwards.
                    
36 Subject to caveats about small sample sizes (although the problem is not as great towards
the end of the period as it is for the cohort analysis, since the calendar year effects
concern the cumulative number of firms privatized), the variation in δf over calendar
years is volatile, again in ways that are hard to correlate with macroeconomic
conditions.  The trend is upward in all four countries, but given the lack of similar
tendency in δd, improvements in the business environment are an implausible
explanation.  More likely is the increasing time since privatization during which foreign
owners steadily increased productivity, as we saw in Figure 2.46




















Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
The Russian and Ukrainian functions also head in opposite directions, and
they actually cross, as the Russian has a strong positive slope. Why Russia
should be so different is not clear ￿ once again, just about any argument for
Russia would appear to apply a fortiori to Ukraine ￿ but the lack of
consistency across countries would seem to rule out this factor as an
explanation of cross-country differences in the privatization effect.
A final hypothesis is that the estimated impact of privatization is subject to
compositional effects. We have already investigated one type of compositional
effect, namely for foreign versus domestic privatizations, although we found
that taking this into account works in the opposite direction for the Hungary-
Romania comparison (i.e., it increases the Romanian effect relative to the
Hungarian), while it can explain only a small part of the differences between
these countries and the former Soviet Republics.  But another possibility is
that differences in composition of these economies by industry, together with
differences in privatization effects by industry, may account for the cross-
country variation.47
The industrial structures of the four countries do in fact differ from one
another, although the two East European countries are more similar to each
other, as are the two former Soviet Republics.  For example, food and
beverages account for 36 percent of all firm-year observations in Russia and
Ukraine, but only 16 percent in Hungary and 23 percent in Romania, while the
share of machinery is 9 and 11 percent among Russian and Ukrainian
observations, respectively, but 13 and 15 percent for Hungary and Romania.
When we permit the δd to vary by industry, we find some variation across
countries, but this could be due to any number of factors including differences
in the predominant methods of privatization used in various industries, in the
timing of privatization by industry, and in the relative quality of industries.
37
In order to assess the impact of differing industrial structure, we can hold
these factors constant by fixing the country- and industry-specific δd and
permitting the industrial shares to vary, with the results shown in Table 8.
Table 8
Counterfactual Domestic Privatization Effects
Assuming Other Countries’ Industrial Structures
Assumed Industrial Structure
Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
Hungary 0.182 0.197 0.203 0.207
Romania 0.223 0.239 0.263 0.262
Russia -0.062 -0.024 -0.038 -0.031
Ukraine 0.045 0.049 0.039 0.044
Note:  The assumed industrial structure comes from the countries listed in the
top row and the effects of domestic privatization are calculated for
countries in the left hand column.
                    
37 The pattern of correlations of the estimated δ by industry is interesting:  the cross-
country δd correlations tend to be high for Hungary and Romania (about 0.5) and even
higher for Hungary and Russia and for Russia and Ukraine (about 0.6), but weaker for
Romania and Russia (0.2), and, depending on method, zero or negative for both of the
pairs Hungary-Ukraine and Romania-Ukraine.  The cross-country correlations of the δf
are lower than for the δd, although the small number of foreign-owned firms is again a
caveat in interpreting this result.  Within countries, the correlations of the δ by industry
are high across estimation methods.48
The results suggest only small adjustments to the estimated δd when a different
country￿s industrial structure is imposed. For instance, the Hungarian δd rises
about 0.015 with the Romanian structure, and the Romanian falls about 0.016
with the Hungarian structure, which does not account for a large fraction of
the difference between the two countries.  The Russian and Ukrainian δd
change even less (0.007 and 0.005) when each other￿s industrial structure is
assumed.  Moreover, the gap between Hungary and Romania, on the one hand,
and Russia and Ukraine, on the other, actually tends to widen, as the δd in both
Hungary and Romania are increased when we impose either the Russian or
Ukrainian industrial structure. Thus, compositional effects associated with
different industry shares provide essentially no traction for understanding
cross-country differences in the productivity impact of privatization, except
for a small contribution to the Hungary-Romania comparison.
6.   CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed the productivity effects of privatization using
comprehensive data on manufacturing firms in four economies, with long time
series of annual observations both before and after privatization.  The data
contain comparable measurement concepts for the key variables, and we have
applied consistent econometric methods to obtain comparable estimates across
countries. The analysis is subject to a number of caveats we have discussed,
including possibilities of measurement error, incomplete longitudinal links,
production function misspecification, and remaining simultaneity bias. To
grapple with these issues, we have made great efforts to clean the data and
improve the longitudinal links, we have investigated a wide variety of
estimation and measurement methods, and we have carried out a number of
extensions to the basic analysis that shed light on the gravity of the potential
problems.  While the caveats should be borne in mind when considering our
findings, we believe that the results nonetheless provide important new
evidence on the impact of privatization.
To summarize, we find a substantial positive effect of privatization on
productivity in Romania, with a range of estimates from 20 to 36 percent,
depending on the precise econometric specification employed. The estimated
effects are also positive for Hungary, but for every estimation method they are
lower than the Romanian estimate, with a range from 14 to 31 percent. In both
of these countries, the estimated effects are always highly significantly
different from zero. For Ukraine, the estimated effects are positive, but always49
much lower ￿ from 2 to 6 percent ￿ and they are sometimes statistically
insignificant.  Finally, we estimate a small negative effect, from 0 to 7 percent,
in Russia.
These results are based on equations that control for correlated effects (firm
fixed effects) and for a full set of industry-year interactions. For any
measurement or specification problem to produce a biased estimate of the
privatization effect would require that the extent of the problem vary
systematically within firms and within industry-year cells. The results are also
robust, in terms of approximate magnitudes and exact ranking of countries, to
a wide variety of approaches to productivity measurement.  The analysis,
therefore, strongly supports the proposition that privatization can have an
substantial impact on firm behavior, but it also implies that the impact can
vary with other factors.
We find that privatization to foreign investors has effects that are rather
similar across countries, nearly all the estimates falling in the range of 37 to 50
percent.  In all four countries, these estimates are much higher than those for
privatization involving predominantly domestic ownership. The consistency of
the estimated foreign effects suggests that the substantial cross-country
differences in the average privatization effects are unlikely to be due to any
differences across countries in types of data, measurement methods, etc.  It
also implies that the variation in the domestic privatization effect is a
substantial puzzle to be explained; indeed, removing the foreign firms
magnifies the difference between Hungary and Romania.
The impact of privatization appears to be immediate in Hungary and Romania,
and nearly immediate (one year later) in Ukraine; in these countries, the
impacts are sustained and in Romania and Ukraine they continue to increase
even after three years.  By contrast, the profile of the dynamics remains
negative in Russia until the fifth year after privatization. In general, the
profiles tend to fan out as time passes, implying that studies relying on data
only for the immediate post-privatization period may understate cross-country
differences.
Our analysis of dynamics in the pre-privatization period shows that
productivity tends to grow in Hungarian and Romanian firms that are
eventually privatized, especially so in Hungarian firms acquired by foreign
investors. In Russia and Ukraine, however, the pre-privatization profile of
productivity is flat for domestic privatizations and sharply negative in the two50
years before acquisition by foreign investors. We conjecture that the
differences in the foreign pre-privatization dynamics may be due to
anticipatory effects, whereby managers in Hungary experience enhanced
career-concern incentives to demonstrate their skills to their anticipated
foreign partners, while those in Russia and Ukraine expect to be automatically
fired and therefore engage in asset stripping.
The dynamics of the privatization effects (domestic and foreign) display a
clear jump around the privatization date in all three countries where we
estimate a positive effect:  Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine. Given that we are
controlling for firm fixed effects and industry-year effects, this suggests that
the effect of privatization on productivity is causal, not the result of some
unobservable tendency for firms undergoing privatization to grow faster
through the whole period. It is not inconceivable that the privatization
coefficient could be biased upward if investors have private information on
growth potential and they are able to buy firms with such potential just before
the growth spurt is realized.  On the other hand, the privatization process in
the countries we are studying was driven at least as much by policymakers as
by investors, and it frequently took several years to execute a privatization
transaction, so it seems hard to believe that this would result in the nearly
contemporaneous jump we observe in the data.  It should also be noted that the
private information of investors, in this story, would have had to pertain to the
future evolution of a firm￿s productivity controlling for industry-years; in
other words, they would have to know that a firm would experience a positive
productivity shock relative to other firms in the same industry and year, and
then they would have to arrange to acquire the firm just before the shock was
realized.  This strikes us as implausible but of course not impossible, and
while our identifying assumption is that such effects are uncorrelated with
ownership change, we cannot entirely rule it out.
All four countries nevertheless show evidence of substantial selection effects
in the privatization process, as the pre-privatization productivity of firms
selected for privatization is higher than that of firms remaining in state
ownership. The difference is especially large for firms to be sold to foreign
owners, with a range of 27-43 percent in estimated pre-privatization
productivity advantage. This finding may reflect the reluctance of
governments to face the painful restructuring that may ensue from the
privatization of weaker enterprises. Our estimation techniques control for such
selection bias through fixed effects, but this result implies that studies using51
cross-sectional data and methods are likely to overstate the impact of
privatization, particularly to foreigners.
In order to better understand the varied effects of privatization to domestic
owners across countries, we also investigate some dimensions of hetero-
geneity in the domestic coefficient. The impact of privatization in Hungary
and Romania is estimated to be strongly negatively related to relative pre-
privatization productivity, but no such relationship is found for Russia and
Ukraine.  The domestic privatization effect does not vary systematically with
cohort (year of privatization) or calendar year in any of the countries. The
relationship with industry output growth is not systematic either. Finally,
while some variation is found in the domestic privatization effect across
industry, this variation is little correlated with differences in industrial
structure across countries.
These findings provide some support for the view that the method of
privatization matters. In our data, the only relevant distinction we can directly
measure is predominant foreign versus domestic ownership, and we find
strong evidence that the former has a bigger impact than the latter in all four
countries.  Moreover, we find that the largest cross-country differences
concern the two East European countries (Hungary and Romania) versus the
two former Soviet Republics (Russia and Ukraine), which may also be
attributed to differences in the ￿quality￿ of privatization, especially the extent
of concentrated outside ownership.  In this sense, our results provide strong
support for Djankov and Murrell￿s (2002) hypothesis of such a difference
between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We also find evidence
of domestic privatization cohort effects within countries, particularly for
Romania and Russia, which in each case correlates with the variation in the
use of insider giveaways versus outside sales methods over time.
But our findings also present some puzzles for this viewpoint.  To start with,
differences in foreign ownership share contribute only a small fraction of the
differences between Hungary (the country with by far the largest share) and
Russia and Ukraine (the countries with the least). Out of a total gap in the
privatization effect of about 0.2, only about 0.05 is accounted for by this
difference.  Secondly, the difference in foreign ownership only deepens the
puzzle about the difference between Hungary and Romania: because the
Romanian domestic effect exceeds the Hungarian, and the foreign exceeds the
domestic effect in both countries, increased foreign ownership in Romania
would have increased the difference between the Romanian and Hungarian52
overall effects. Third, the cross-country variation in our estimated
privatization cohort effects is frequently inconsistent with the implications of
differences in methods. The estimated domestic effects in Romania, for
instance, are at least as great as those in Hungary for practically every cohort,
including some when Romanian privatization was dominated by management-
employee buyouts (1994-1995) and the highly dispersed mass privatization
program (1996). In both Russia and Ukraine, the early cohorts represent mass
insider privatization, but the Ukrainian effects are much larger than the
Russian.  Sales become much more prevelant in the mid- and late 1990s in
both of these countries, but while the cohort effects become larger in Russia,
they actually decline in Ukraine.
The other main potential explanations for the cross-country differences
founder similarly. Macroeconomic stability, economic growth, business
environment, and hardness of budget constraints might help to explain either
the interregional (Hungary and Romania versus Russia and Ukraine)
differences or, alternatively, those within regions, but not both at the same
time.  Suppose, for example, that macroeconomic stability, economic growth,
strong institutions, hard budget constraints, and sales methods contribute to
more successful privatization. This could explain why Hungary and
Romania￿s privatization effects are stronger than Russia and Ukraine￿s, but it
cannot explain why Romania￿s is stronger than Hungary￿s and Ukraine￿s is
stronger than Russia￿s. Alternatively, suppose these factors attenuate the
privatization effect. That would explain the within-region differences, but not
the interregional ones. These results thus cast doubt on stories commonly
promulgated for cross-country variation.
Explanations associated with the business and macroeconomic environment
have additional difficulties explaining the lack of systematic pattern in the
privatization effect across calendar years. If what really matters is the quality
of rule of law, contract enforcement, and supporting institutions, then the
privatization effect should be higher initially in Hungary than in the other
countries, and it should increase over time in all countries as the business
environment improves. But the data do not display this pattern. If what really
matters is the macroeconomic environment, then the privatization effect
should be correlated with the fluctuations of the macroeconomy in each
country.  Again, while the privatization effect does fluctuate, the correlation
with inflation and output growth is difficult to perceive.  Even when we
consider disaggregated industry growth rates as an indicator of demand53
conditions for the firm, we find no evidence that these matter for the
privatization effect.
The one explanation that seems somewhat helpful for the intra-regional
comparison of Hungary and Romania is the heterogeneity of the estimated
privatization effect with respect to relative pre-privatization productivity.  For
both Hungary and Romania, we find a similar pattern whereby firms with
lower pre-privatization productivity are improved more by privatization than
those whose rank in the pre-privatization distribution was higher. The specific
magnitudes are also suggestive, in that an increase of one standard deviation in
the pre-privatization productivity distribution is estimated to lower the
privatization effect by 15 percentage points, and we find that Hungarian firm
productivity exceeds Romanian by about 27.7 percent, thereby accounting for
about 4 percentage points of the 6-12 percentage point gap in the privatization
effects of the two countries. This factor does not help to explain, however, the
difference between Russia and Ukraine.
Thus, while our research provides a set of robust estimates of privatization
effects, their heterogeneity along several dimensions, and their dynamics for
four countries, it also raises some puzzles associated with the estimated cross-
country differences. In particular, the conventional explanations of privati-
zation method, business environment, and macroeconomic growth appear
unable to explain much of the variation. Of course, it could be the case that
our particular combination of countries fails to capture the relevant
considerations. The countries in our sample not only have the strong
advantage that we have been able to assemble nearly comprehensive
microdata on the originally state-owned manufacturing sector, but they also
nicely straddle the distribution of policy choices and outcomes among
transition economies, at least according to conventional observers. Making
further progress in understanding when privatization works, however, may
require assembling and analyzing comparable data for still more countries.54
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Table A1: Estimated Marginal Products by Industry
Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
Industry CD-OLS CD-IV OP Translog CD-IV OP Translog CD-OLS CD-IV OP Translog CD-OLS CD-IV OP Translog
Capital
1 0.096 0.425 0.141 0.164 0.090 0.053 0.115 0.088 0.034 0.004 0.040 0.061 0.046 -0.021 0.034 0.017
2 0.017 0.037 0.070 0.008 0.150 0.096 0.170 0.145 0.005 0.050 0.037 -0.006 0.209 0.074 0.221 0.127
3 0.130 0.209 0.254 0.133 0.124 0.252 0.206 0.058 0.025 0.012 0.032 0.042 0.261 0.219 0.210 0.255
4 0.208 0.362 0.281 0.103 0.102 0.144 0.149 0.076 0.083 0.105 0.121 0.059 0.186 0.105 0.126 0.146
5 0.086 0.150 0.130 0.106 0.035 0.110 0.137 0.053 0.075 0.059 0.079 0.063 0.084 0.038 0.079 0.083
6 0.133 0.132 0.219 0.157 0.119 0.160 0.240 0.129 0.133 0.159 0.165 0.123 0.031 0.114 0.119 0.090
7 0.102 0.403 0.133 0.154 0.051 0.090 0.104 0.004 0.029 0.021 0.022 0.030 0.155 0.219 0.194 0.089
8 0.099 0.241 0.181 0.137 0.101 0.084 0.186 0.085 0.044 0.042 0.071 0.090 0.108 0.094 0.080 0.121
9 0.073 0.165 0.141 0.046 0.101 0.037 0.132 0.087 0.004 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.094 0.094 0.089 0.048
10 0.145 0.315 0.222 0.151 0.105 -0.103 0.215 0.167 -0.011 -0.032 -0.022 -0.010 0.042 0.074 0.108 0.111
Labor
1 1.108 0.850 1.041 0.964 1.388 1.436 1.375 1.350 1.357 1.471 1.351 1.343 1.444 1.448 1.456 1.645
2 0.838 0.803 0.754 0.867 1.066 1.208 1.039 1.110 1.355 1.286 1.373 1.337 1.122 0.969 1.051 1.263
3 0.996 1.025 0.935 1.010 0.762 0.726 0.721 0.938 1.105 1.098 1.119 1.094 1.107 0.901 1.046 1.150
4 0.847 0.678 0.739 0.904 1.086 1.096 0.981 1.169 1.403 1.495 1.424 1.433 1.194 1.132 1.196 1.335
5 0.904 0.888 0.795 0.856 0.692 0.565 0.519 0.696 0.939 1.116 0.872 0.966 1.035 1.121 0.938 0.997
6 0.887 0.899 0.802 0.929 1.220 1.306 1.115 1.329 0.998 1.059 0.964 1.294 1.418 1.331 1.459 1.380
7 0.987 0.634 0.886 0.938 0.933 0.899 0.844 0.979 1.378 1.389 1.379 1.338 1.472 1.492 1.413 1.773
8 0.875 0.849 0.824 0.872 1.153 1.158 1.061 1.183 1.236 1.343 1.225 1.199 1.366 1.188 1.425 1.277
9 0.803 0.785 0.749 0.823 0.842 0.860 0.763 0.902 1.341 1.447 1.370 1.361 1.190 1.031 1.159 1.369
10 0.779 0.710 0.687 0.786 0.886 0.590 0.606 0.639 1.248 1.149 1.244 1.241 1.334 1.123 1.302 1.421
Note:  1=Food, Beverages, and Tobacco; 2=Textiles; 3=Apparel, Fur, and Leather; 4=Wood, Pulp, Paper, Furniture, and Manufacturing NEC; 5=Publishing,
Printing, and Recorded Media; 6=Fuels, Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastic; 7=Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products; 8=Basic Metals, and Fabricated
Metals; 9=Machinery and Equipment NEC; 10=Electrical and Optical Equipment.60
Table A2  Alternative Estimates of Privatization Effects
Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
Cobb-Douglas imposing CRS
δ￿ 0.204** 0.292** -0.060** 0.061**
(0.022) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020)
δ￿ f 0.535** 0.452** 0.437** 0.493**
(0.048) (0.095) (0.161) (0.158)
δ￿ d 0.168** 0.281** -0.061** 0.062**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020)
Translog
δ￿ 0.218** 0.245** -0.046** 0.052**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019)
δ￿ f 0.518** 0.394** 0.403** 0.396**
(0.049) (0.088) (0.154) (0.151)
δ￿ d 0.186** 0.234** -0.047** 0.051**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019)
Assuming θ = 0.5
δ￿ 0.262** 0.329** -0.029 0.039
(0.026) (0.030) (0.019) (0.021)
δ￿ f 0.492** 0.414** 0.359* 0.422**
(0.051) (0.099) (0.164) (0.170)
δ￿ d 0.239** 0.323** -0.031 0.039
(0.027) (0.031) (0.019) (0.022)
Assuming θ = 0.3
δ￿ 0.282** 0.340** -0.016 0.031
(0.031) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022)
δ￿ f 0.471** 0.396** 0.329* 0.397*
(0.058) (0.107) (0.170) (0.176)
δ￿ d 0.263** 0.337** -0.019 0.032
(0.032) (0.034) (0.021) (0.032)
Assuming θ = 0.0
δ￿ 0.310** 0.357** 0.002 0.019
(0.040) (0.040) (0.025) (0.024)
δ￿ f 0.439** 0.369** 0.282 0.359
(0.073) (0.123) (0.183) (0.189)
δ￿ d 0.299** 0.356** -0.001 0.023
(0.041) (0.041) (0.025) (0.025)
Note:  ** = significant at 1-percent level.  * = significant at 5-percent level. Standard Errors are
shown in parentheses.61
Table A3  Effect of Domestic Privatization by Industry
Hungary Romania Russia Ukraine
Industry CD-OLS CD-IV OP Translog CD-OLS CD-IV OP Translog CD-OLS CD-IV OP Translog CD-OLS CD-IV OP Translog
1 0.235** 0.154** 0.174** 0.235** 0.402** 0.371** 0.327** 0.382** -0.002 -0.006 -0.031 -0.006 0.010 -0.004 -0.001 0.011
2 0.176* 0.112 0.107 0.181* 0.257** 0.234** 0.216* 0.250** 0.111 0.091** 0.051 0.130* 0.163 0.091 0.097 0.161
3 0.065 -0.017 -0.006 0.062 0.066 0.107 0.110 0.071 -0.275** -0.279** -0.328** -0.290** 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.010
4 0.200** 0.116** 0.123* 0.193** 0.256** 0.275** 0.255** 0.240** -0.240** -0.222** -0.273** -0.234** -0.123 -0.099* -0.086 -0.088
5 0.219* 0.184** 0.161 0.188* 0.316* 0.410** 0.407* 0.335* -0.036 -0.057 -0.088 -0.021 0.040 0.030 0.033 0.052
6 0.076 0.059 0.038 0.077 0.209** 0.147* 0.099 0.143 0.009 -0.021 -0.054 0.023 0.235* 0.231** 0.233* 0.207*
7 0.247** 0.149* 0.248* 0.233** 0.096* 0.095 0.079 0.113* 0.113** 0.111** 0.084* 0.099** 0.158** 0.115** 0.126** 0.190**
8 0.238** 0.196** 0.194** 0.242** 0.226** 0.253** 0.197** 0.231** 0.193* 0.162** 0.140 0.198* 0.006 -0.017 -0.018 0.009
9 0.225** 0.127** 0.133* 0.220** 0.131** 0.121** 0.077* 0.140** -0.095* -0.046 -0.068 -0.090* 0.051 0.055 0.058 0.065
10 0.150 0.038 0.036 0.160* 0.200* 0.151 0.050 0.229* -0.168* -0.148** -0.173* -0.171** 0.088 0.096 0.099 0.082
Note:  1=Food, Beverages, and Tobacco; 2=Textiles; 3=Apparel, Fur, and Leather; 4=Wood, Pulp, Paper, Furniture, and Manufacturing NEC;
5=Publishing, Printing, and Recorded Media; 6=Fuels, Chemicals, Rubber, and Plastic; 7=Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products; 8=Basic
Metals, and Fabricated Metals; 9=Machinery and Equipment NEC; 10=Electrical and Optical Equipment.  ** = significant at 1-percent level.
* = significant at 5-percent level.